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CASE SUMMARIES - FALL 1993

ANTITRUST
STORER CABLE COMMUNICATION, INC. V. CITY OF MONTGOMERY,

ALABAMA, 826 F. Supp. 1338 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
A new local cable television operator, Montgomery Cablevision
Entertainment, Inc. ("MCE"), intervened as a defendant in a suit
against the City of Montgomery ("City") by the existing cable operator, Storer Cable Communication, Inc. ("Storer"), and its programming suppliers and distributors. MCE filed a counterclaim
against the plaintiffs and others alleging violations of the Sherman
Act, the Alabama Code, Alabama state common law governing monopolies, a city ordinance and state tort law.
As a start-up cable company competing against the incumbent
Storer, which reached 92% of the market, MCE approached supplier Turner Network Television, Inc. ("Turner") and ESPN, Inc.
("ESPN") and requested to carry their high demand programming.
Such programming was essential to MCE's ability to attract customers and compete. Turner and ESPN refused to sell MCE their
programming, and, at the same time, they entered into exclusive
supply contracts with Storer. MCE claims that Storer entered into
these contracts with the intent of protecting its monopoly, and
that these actions had the effect of restraining competition and injuring MCE. The counterclaim defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that MCE had not sufficiently alleged, as required
under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the existence of relevant markets
which were adversely affected based on a contract or conspiracy in
restraint of trade. Further, it was claimed that MCE had not sufficiently alleged monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy to monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
Held: The court held that MCE alleged sufficient facts to state
a claim against the counterclaim defendants for all of the alleged
causes of action, with the exception of the state law tort of intentional interference with business relations to the extent that it related to prospective rather than current customers. The court also
held that MCE must plead sufficient facts so that each element of
the alleged antitrust violation can be identified, and that the claim
should only be dismissed if the underlying theory of the complaint
is "economically senseless."
Under the claim involving § 1 of the Sherman Act, the court
found the allegation of exclusive dealing among the counterclaim
defendants sufficient, and after a thorough analysis of both intrabrand and interbrand competition, concluded that MCE did allege plausible relevant markets as well as anti-competitive effects.
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Under § 2 of the Sherman Act, the court found sufficient facts of
possession and maintenance of monopoly power, intentional anticompetitive conduct, and deliberate concerted action with the intent to monopolize. Additionally, the court held the claims to be
sufficient under Alabama law, which was analytically identical to
federal antitrust law.
J.S.
SHERMAN ACT
CALDWELL V. AMERICAN BASKETBALL ASS'N,

825 F. Supp. 558

(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
A former star basketball player who was suspended from his
team opposes defendant's motion for summary judgement on his
antitrust and tort action against a basketball association, its commissioner, his former team, and its owners. Plaintiff, Joseph L.
Caldwell, negotiated a contract with the Carolina Cougars, an
American Basketball Association ("ABA") team, in 1970. The contract incorporated only some provisions of the ABA Uniform
Player's Contract, giving the Cougars authority to suspend a player
without pay for violations of established rules, and the power to
terminate the contract in case of breach by the player. The contract did not incorporate the clause binding the player to the ABA
Constitution and by-laws, which provide that a suspended player is
placed on a "reserve list" and cannot "contract with" another team
until the suspending team gives written notice to the ABA Commissioner. The subsequently renamed and relocated team, The
Spirits of St. Louis, suspended Caldwell for allegedly advising another star player to "negotiate" a better contract by missing an
important game. Caldwell claimed that he then automatically ended up on the reserve list "forever" in December of 1974, pursuant
to the ABA by-laws. Thus, Caldwell alleged that the defendants
"combined and conspired to blacklist him" resulting in Caldwell
never playing professional basketball again, thus violating § 1 of
the Sherman Act. Caldwell further alleged that defendants monopolized the players' market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act
and state tort law. Defendants argued that Caldwell's inability to
play again arose from his age and physical condition.
Held: The court held that Caldwell failed to present sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that a conspiracy or
monopoly existed. The ABA's by-laws, providing for automatic
placement of a suspended player on the "reserve list," are not sufficient by themselves to meet the concerted action requirement of
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